ABSTRACT
I. Introduction and Summary.
In recent years, some economists have adopted a new approach to the theory of individual choices that helps to explain a number of phenomena that are difficult to understand within the confines of the traditional economic theory. This new approach argues that the characteristics of commodities provide (directly or indirectly) utility to individuals and/or services to production processes. Houthakker (1952) pioneered this approach to the problem of quality variation and to the theory of consumer behavior. Becker (1965) , Lancaster (1966) , and Muth (1966) extended Houthakker's analysis to study consumer behavior but they did not work out the properties of market equilibrium. They assumed that commodities traded in the market do not possess final consumption attributes and that consumers are also producers. The consumers use the commodities purchased in the market as inputs into a self-production function for ultimate characteristics. Rosen (1976) studies both consumer and producer behavior and the properties of market equilibrium. Rosen assumes that consumers are not producers and that Tinbergen (1959) respect to the numeraire good is constant (hence the income elasticity of demand for the product is zero), the variance-covariance matrices of the exogenously given distributions have to be diagonal or satisfy other restrictions, the number of consumer characteristics equals the number of product characteristics, and the price equation parameters are not unique.
I assume that a function maps physical characteristics into a scalar quality index and that economic agents care only about the quality of the commodity that they purchase. While this is a strong assumption, this quality index technology allows me to impose weaker a priori restrictions in other respects. The result is a class of models1 with closed-form solutions that does not have the restrictive features enumerated above. In this paper, I present one of those models and an application. The theory characterizes market equilibrium and the application investigates how far one can go with closed form solutions and how well the resulting model fits the data. The application shows that it is feasible to estimate and test a closed-form model.
Section 11 reviews the non-structural approach. Section III introduces the theoretical model that I use to illustrate the kind of analysis that the structural approach can perform. This model assumes that the income and the supply distributions are exogenous and that consumers use the services of only one unit of the differentiated good. However, versions of the same basic model can relax these assumptions (see Giannias (1987) ). An application is discussed in Section IV. Section V investigates extensions of the basic model. Concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. The Non-Structural Approach.
Observed product prices and the specific amounts of characteristics can provide estimates for implicit or hedonic prices. The non-structural approach uses this information to derive the demand functions for the characteristics of a differentiated product. These demand functions can be used to compute the willingness to pay for marginal or non-marginal changes in the product characteristics,_ for example, Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) and Ridker and Henning (1967) . Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) advanced the state-of-the-art by recognizing that the derivative of the price function is not a good approximation for assessing the benefit of changes in product characteristics.
As demonstrated in Epple (1987) , most of the work that uses the hedonic approach is unsatisfying because the estimation methods do not yield consistent estimates. Bartik (1987) and Palmquist (1984) The differentiated good can be accurately described by a vector, v, of objectively measured characteristics. I assume that the consumers care only about the quality index, h, of the differentiated product. The quality, h, is a scalar and a function of the vector of physical characteristics, v. The model lets consumers have different utility functions and income. Each consumer can be described by a (1x2) vector z, where z = [< I], I is the consumer income, and r is a utility parameter. z is assumed to follow a multi-normal distribution with a mean z and a variance C,. Let it be:
Given r, U(h,x;c) is the utility that a consumer obtains from x and from the services function is assumed 7 of a differentiated good of h-quality. The utility to be a quadratic of the following form.
where 6, r, E, a, and 0 are utility parameters (scalars).
(2)
A consumer with income I and a utility parameter c solves the following optimization problem:
max U(h,x;c) with respect to h, x subject to I = P(h) + x where P(h) is the equilibrium price equation; it gives the price of the differentiated good as a function of the quality index, h. Eliminating x, the first order condition for the consumer's optimization problem is equivalent to:
where Ph(h) and Ui(h,x;r) are the first partial derivatives of P(h) and U(h,x;r) with respect to h and i respectively, i = h, x.
The supply for the differentiated product is exogenously given and the quality h follows an esogenously given normal distribution with a mean h and a variance u 2 Let it be:
The 
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a prime It'11 will always denote the transpose of a vector or Proof* Substitute equations (2) and (5) into equation (3) and solve for h to obtain the equilibrium demand for h. The equilibrium demand for h, i.e., the demand function after substituting out P(h), is given by the following equation:
where t is given in (8).
The equilibrium demand for h is linear in z. Therefore (1) and (10) (12), and (4).
The second order condition requires: (2 w xl -<) > 0. From inspection of (6) it is seen that this second order condition is satisfied. It can be verified that the following equations, r 1 = ({ -A)/(2 w) and 7ro = (-B nl + t ;I -A K>/w also satisfy the equilibrium equations (13) and (14). However, this solution is ruled out because it does not satisfy the second order condition.
QED
To illustrate that the price equation is an equilibrium relationship that incorporates features of tastes, supply, and the distributions of income and parameters of taste and supply, I present the following example.
Consider an economy in which consumers ha-le identical preferences that can be described by the following utility function: u = 100 + h + 2x + 0.5 h2 + xh, where x and h are defined above. Consumers are assumed to use the services of one differentiated good. Let the consumer income follow an exogenously given normal distribution with a mean that is equal to 550 and a variance that is equal to 400. The quality of the differentiated good is assumed to follow an exogenously given normal distribution that is given in (4). Let this distribution have a mean equal to 2 and a variance that is equal to 1 IV. An Application.
The model that I presented in the previous section can be used for a study of the residential housing market. The empirical example that follows shows that it is feasible to estimate and test a closed-form model. The results of the empirical example will be used to investigate the willingness to pay for clean air.
IV.A. The Economic Model.
The differentiated product rental residential housing can be described by a vector of characteristics v, where v = [vl v2 v3] , v1 is the size of the housing unit (number of rooms), v2 is an air quality index, and v3 is the travel time to work. v is assumed to follow an exogenously given multi-
The quality of housing, h (a scalar), is assumed ,to be a linear function of the vector of housing characteristics v, that is,
3 is a vector of parameters . The Proposition and equation (10) imply that the equilibrium demand for h is:
1V.B. The Econometric Model.
P-c + P, vl + 8, v2 + B, v3 + u1 , and thinking of ul as a measurement error in price'and u 2 as unmeasured buyer characteristics that are uncorrelated with measured buyer characteristics.
The complete model consists of equations (15) 
Ordinary least squares is appropriate under assumptions Al to A3. Deviations between the actual housing quality and its estimate (estimated from equation (29)) are measurement errors in the dependent variable in equation (30) and hence do not affect the consistency of ordinary least squares. The parameter estimates are given in Table 2 . They imply that the equilibrium demand for housing quality is: h = -1.52 + 0.026 a + 0.000172 I
1V.D. Test of the Model.
To see if the model makes a significant contribution to explaining the data, I tested the hypothesis that all the parameters of the equation (19) equal zero, that is, p, = ,,9, = 6, = 0. An F-test implies that this hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level. A similar F-test rejects the hypothesis that all the parameters of the second equation, equation (20), equal zero at the 1% significance level.
The t-statistics (see Tables 1 and 2) show that the size of a house and the travel time to work variable (which are expected to be the main determinants of the.rent), as well as the income (which is expected to be the main determinant of the equilibrium demand for housing quality) are significant at the 1% significance level. Moreover, all coefficients have the anticipated signs in both equations.
For the residential housing market, I espect the parameters ~1, c2, and cl to satisfy: cl > 0, c2 < 0, and rl > 0. That is, I expect 1) the housing quality to increase as air quality increases, 2) the housing quality to decrease as the travel time to work increases, and 3) the utility that is obtained from each additional unit of housing quality to increase as the size of the family increases. The parameter estimates obtained in this section show that the first t;lo of the above inequalities are satisfied. In Section V.E., it is shown that the third inequality is also satisfied.
To investigate the internal consistency of the theory (given additive error terms), I test the joint normality of prices and product characteristics, and of product quality, family size and income. To be more specific, I test the null hypothesis that ui is normally distributed, i = 1, In addition to the above, the following regression model is considered: P(') = 8, v~(~) + 8, v2(l) + p, v3('), where z(') -(z' -1)/X for X f 0 and z(') = log(z) for X = 0, z = P, vl, v2, v3, h, a, I.
Considering the more practically interesting cases of X = 1 and X -0 and applying the Box-Cox procedure, see Box and Cox (1962) , it is obtained that x = 1 yields a smaller residual variance. The four step estimation procedure of Section 1v.c. is then repeated with (30) being replaced by: h(X) = yl a(') + y 2 I(X). Application of the Box-Cox procedure on the last equation for X = 1 and X = 0 implies that X = 1 yields a smaller residual variance. These estimation results indicate that a linear specification is preferred to a log-log for both equations.
In the Appendix, models that assume Cobb-Douglas utility functions, a Tinbergen (1959)-Epple (1984) type of quadratic utility function, and loglog and log-linear in product characteristics quality index (and price) equations have been tested and found to be inconsistent with the data.
The above tests provide evidence in favor of the internal consistency of the theory of Section III and of the additional assumptions of Section 1V.A with the data. These tests and the qualitative properties of the estimated model suggest that our formulation is not inappropriate for analyzing the structure of the housing market of Houston.
1V.E. Structural Analysis.
The parameter estimates that I obtained in rhe previous section allow me to analyze the structure of the housing market of Houston and specify how the structure depends on the mean of the air quality distribution. The latter enables me to address interesting questions that a non-structural approach cannot.
IV.E.(i). The Houston Housing Market.
Given the parameter estimates obtained in Section 1V.C. and equations (21)- (27) We can now see that 1) the rent is positi-.vely related to the quality of 2 house8, 2) the equilibrium demand for housing quality is positively related to the size of the family and income (see equation (31)), 3) the housing quality is positively related to air qualit;r and negatively to travel time to work (see equation (29)), and 4) the marginal utility with respect to housing quality is positively related to the size of a family (see equation (32)). These qualitative properties are as one would intuitively expect. 
IV.E.(ii) The Houston Housing
The above results are used to illustrate the kind of questions that a structural analysis can address. The purpose of the illustration is not to determine the precise dollar figure of the willingness to pay for an improvement in air quality. Rather, it is to illustrate how to perform a general equilibrium analysis that is accomodated by the model, and to show that the previous (partial equilibrium) common practice for computing the willingness to pay for a non-marginal change in one of the characteristics of a differentiated good can yield a very different benefit figure.
A consumer's willingness to pay for a y% improvement in air quality, W, is defined to be the solution to the following equation:
V(a,I,t) = V(a,I+W,t+y/lOO) (35) where t is the mean air quality in Houston, and V(a,I,t) is the equilibrium indirect utility function of an [a II-type consumer given that the mean air quality of the city of Houston equals t. That is, the consumer's benefit from a y% change in the mean air quality is the part of his income that he is willing to give up so that the utility after the y% change, taking account of equilibrium price adjustments, equals the utility before the y% change.
I compute the benefit to the mean household in Houston of a l%, 2.5%, 5%, 7.5%, lO%, 12.5X, and 15% improvement in the mean air quality of the city. That is, I compute W for y = 1, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15. The steps involved in the computation are explained next.
To obtain the equilibrium indirect utility function, I substitute the equilibrium demands for housing quality and numeraire good, equations (33) and (34) respectively, into the utility function, equation (32). Into this equilibrium indirect utility function I substitute the mean income, the mean number of persons in a household, and the mean air quality of Houston (see Table 3 ). With these substitutions equation (35) Solving the last equationlO with respect to W for y = 1, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, and 15, I obtain the benefit figures that are given in Table 5 .
Nest, I contrast these results to the ones obtained using the non-structural approach and I compare the results. To compute benefits using the nonstructural approach, I integrate the marginal willingness to pay from v2 to v2 + i2 y/100 to obtain a measure of the willingness to pay l1 for a y% change in the mean air quality of Houston. To illustrate this method, I use the price equation given in Table 1 .
Given a rental price equation that is linear in air quality (see Section IV.D.), the non-structural approach defines the willingness to pay in the following way": W = 12 (AQC) (DV), where DV is the change in the mean air quality of Houston, and AQC = 6701.2 is the coefficient of the air quality variable in the rental price equation (see Table 1 ). Calculating the benefit of the mean household using the latter definition for the willingness to pay, I obtain the estimates given in Table 6 .
From Tables 5 and 6 , we can now see that the two methods give very different benefit figures even for small changes in the mean air quality (e.g., a 1% change). The benefit figures of Table 6 are 90.5% below the benefit figure based on the structural model (given on Table 5 ). This difference arises only because of differences in method of calculation, since the same price equation parameters were used for both calculations.
Hence, the non-structural approach does not give a good approximation to the currently calculated measure of willingness to pay.
For a complete investigation of the problem I study, the effects of air quality improvements on the suppliers should be examined. Air quality improvements shift the price equation for housing quality downwards and the housing quality distribution changes. Total Net Benefit equals the sum of Total Consumer Benefit and Total Supplier Benefit. To get an idea about the magnitude of that figure, I multiplied the sum of the mean consumer benefit and the annual change in rent revenues of the mean house by the total number of households in Houston (602,696) for several air quality improvements.
These results, as well as the Net Social Benefit per Household, are given in Table 7 . The results imply that an Automobile Emission Control Policy that improves air quality by 10% is justified if it does not cost more than $106.87 per household. These results also show that the biggest effect of a uniform increase in air quality is a distributional effect that is implied by a drop in rental prices (the net social benefit per household is approximately 9% of the net tenant benefit in Table 5 ).
V. Extensions of the Basic Model.
To apply the theory of Section III, assumptions about the utility parameter r and the quality index equation must be introduced. In Section IV, for example, it is assumed that r is linear in family size and that the quality index equation is linear in the vector of product characteristics,
V.
In general, the utility parameter { can be a polynomial function of a, r(a), of degree n, and the quality index equation can be a polynomial function of product characteristics, v, and a, h(v,a), of degree m, where a is a vector of characteristics that specifies the type of a consumer.
Independently of the degrees of the polynomial functions r(a) and h(v,a), n and m respectively, the four step estimation method of Section IV can be applied and all the structural parameters of interest can be identified. However, the four step estimation method will not be applicable in those cases.
VI. Conclusions.
To estimate the willingness to pay for a non-marginal change in air quality or another attribute, the non-structural approach takes the marginal willingness to pay schedule as given. That (implicitly) assumes that the air quality distribution does not change; a change-in the air quality distribution shifts the price equation and the marginal willingness to pay curve. Consequently, this method cannot be used to estimate the benefit from a policy that implies a non-marginal change in the air quality distribution or other exogenous parameters. The empirical results show that this method could even miscalculate benefits of small changes in the air quality distribution.
The structural approach can provide an estimate for the consumer utility function and can compute the changes in the equilibrium demand for housing quality and numeraire good that are implied by changes in exogenous parameters. Consequently, it can compute the willingness to pay for such changes. The model that I present in this paper is offered for this kind of structural analysis. It is also an important result that we do not need data for more than one city or time series data in order to estimate the proposed structural model. This is not necessarily the case with a non-structural approach. For example, Witte's and al (1979) experiment cannot be replicated with data from only one city, see Brown and Rosen (1981) . The above formulation implies that the demand for Vi, i = 1, 2, 3, is the following:
where the parameters satisfy:
The null hypothesis that the parameters of (36) satisfy (37) is rejected at the 1% significance level.
Alternatively, it is assumed that cons*aers have identical preferences that can be described by the following utili;jr function:
and that the price equation is:
where b, G, and x are parameters, x is the numeraire good, and the housing quality is a function of v, h = h(v).
First it is assumed that the housing quality index equation is In(h) = ~1 ln(v1) + ~2 ln(v2) + c3 ln(v3), where Vi is defined in Section IV and Ei is a parameter, i = 1, 2, 3. This specification implies that the price equation and the demand for housing quality are equivalent to:
In(P) = m0 + ml In(I) + m2 ln(vl) + m3 ln(v2) + m4 ln(v3) 
The model can be estimated13 using the following four step method. STEP ( 1984) formulation shows that this is. not an appropriate formulation because the null hypothesis that the income elasticity of the demand for vi, i = 1, 2, 3, is zero is rejected at the 1% significance level.
equilibrium demand for housing quality. 13. Note that all the parameters of the model can be identified.
